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ABSTRACT
Influenza pandemics generally occur at 30-40 year intervals and it has been nearly 40 years since the last one.
A global pandemic will result in devastating social, economical, and health consequences. Preparedness is
crucial to minimize the threat to hematopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT) patients. Vaccines, antivirals, and
infection control measures are important elements of prevention. Antivirals, often given presumptively, are the
mainstay of therapy.
© 2007 American Society for Blood and Marrow Transplantation
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The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
utbreak in 2003 reminded us of how globally in-
erconnected we all are and the potential of infec-
ious diseases to render all of us vulnerable to con-
iderable threat. Recently, sporadic occurrences of
ype A(H5N1) inﬂuenza (avian ﬂu) has emphasized
he specter of pandemics to threaten not just individ-
als at risk but entire populations. Such fears of pan-
emics have been magniﬁed by the laggard and unco-
rdinated emergency response to Hurricane Katrina
nd such an example teaches us of the importance of
mergency preparedness and rapid response.
HE THREAT
Pandemics occur 3 or 4 times each century. In
ecent history, inﬂuenza pandemics occurred in 1918-
919, 1957-1958, and 1968-1969, and millions of
eaths occurred worldwide with each instance. Even
ith wide availability of inﬂuenza vaccine and public
ealth programs to encourage awareness and mass
accination, each year 30 000-50 000 inﬂuenza deaths
ccur in the United States.
SARS, which is caused by a novel coronavirus, was
rst recognized in 2002-20023 in southern China and
ong Kong [1]. With global travel part of today’s
ocial fabric, this quickly became a pandemic. More
han 8000 individuals in 29 countries became infected
ver a 7-month period, with a case fatality rate rang-
ng from 6% to 17%. Despite modern medicine’s colecular diagnostic tools, availability of rapid com-
unication networks, and established public health
inistries in virtually all affected countries, delays
ontributed to the spread of the disease. Remarkably,
any victims were health care workers and transmis-
ion within hospitals and other health care settings
as a major source of spread [2].
Today there is a substantial fear of the potential
or avian inﬂuenza (H5N1) to cause a pandemic. Sev-
ral avian inﬂuenza viruses have caused human ill-
esses over the years, but the H5N1 strain was ﬁrst
ecognized to cause human infection in 1957 in asso-
iation with a poultry outbreak in Hong Kong [3].
he case fatality rate was an alarming 33%. Multiple
ther poultry outbreaks have been noted in Asia in the
ast 3 yr [4]. More recently, spread of the virus has
aken place by migratory bird populations [5]. More
han 200 human cases have occurred, with a cumula-
ive case fatality of approximately 50%. Although the
urrent strains of H5N1 are poorly transmissible from
uman to human, reassortment of genes may occur to
llow enhanced infectivity as has happened with other
nﬂuenza strains and a pandemic could ensue [6]. The
orld Health Organization has warned that a global
andemic may be at hand.
A global pandemic will have serious social, eco-
omic, political, and health implications. Despite
edical advances that could possibly mitigate an out-
reak, there are many modern factors that will make
pread a greater hazard today. Travel may spread the
athogen rapidly and to distant sites. Increasing con-
entrations of people in densely populated cities will
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J. R. Wingard108acilitate spread. There are much larger groups of
ighly immunocompromised patients who likely will
ave more severe disease and may shed larger num-
ers of virus particles and for longer durations, which
ould spread the infection more efﬁciently to others.
hese include patients who undergo HSCT and solid
rgan transplantation. The SARS outbreak had a pro-
ound effect on transplantation activities in the To-
onto outbreak and necessitated cessation of trans-
lantation activity [7]. It is highly likely that a global
andemic will have serious repercussions on HSCT
rograms and preparedness and rapid response are
mportant to minimize threat to transplant recipients.
TEPS OF PREPARATION
Pharmaceuticals (vaccines and antivirals) are im-
ortant tools for inﬂuenza prevention [8]. During
onpandemic years, inﬂuenza vaccination of patients
fter HSCT, families and caregivers of patients after
SCT, and the HSCT program staff should be vig-
rously encouraged. Currently, there is no H5N1
accine available, although research is ongoing. There
s a real possibility that early during a pandemic a
accine will not be available. Accordingly, antivirals
re other important tools for prevention and treat-
ent. There are 2 classes of inﬂuenza antivirals [9].
he adamantine drugs (amantidine and rimantidine),
2 inhibitors, are effective against inﬂuenza type A
but not type B). Unfortunately, H5N1 strains are
esistant to amantidine [10]. In contrast, the neur-
minidase inhibitors, oseltamivir and zanamivir, are
ffective against inﬂuenza types A and B, including
mantadine-resistant strains. The neuraminidase in-
ibitors have been used in transplant recipients, found
ffective for inﬂuenza infections, are well tolerated,
nd lack signiﬁcant interactions with immunosuppres-
ive regimens. However, emergence of resistance has
een reported in patients after HSCT [11]. It is ex-
ected that the neuraminidase inhibitors will be im-
ortant as chemoprophylaxis in the event of an out-
reak. One cautionary note is the observation of
esistance in some H5N1-infected patients who did
ot respond to therapy [12].
Nonpharmaceutical measures are probably even
ore important steps of prevention [13]. Travel may
eed to be highly restricted to avoid spread. Infected
atients or those with symptoms suggestive of infection
hould be isolated. Visitors or family members who have
ymptoms of inﬂuenza should avoid contact with pa-
ients after HSCT. Isolation should be maintained until
he threat of shedding dissipates. Health care workers
ith symptoms suggestive of infections should also avoid
ontact with patients. During outbreaks aggregation of
roups of individuals should be avoided. This will affect
aiting areas of clinics and hospitals. Personal protection seasures should be emphasized. Such measures include
and washing, wearing of masks, and respiratory hy-
iene. Ordinary surgical masks may offer protection
gainst droplet transmission (thought to be the major
ode of transmission), whereas the high-efﬁciency N95
ask offers additional protection against airborne trans-
ission (thought to also be a mode of transmission,
lthoughmuch less important). The health care staff is at
igh risk of infection and should be provided maximal
rotection measures to optimize their ability to function
nd maintain morale.
ESPONSE ACTIONS
At the onset of an outbreak, it is important for the
SCT team to review its emergency preparedness
lan and coordinate plans with the infection control
eam of the hospital. A suggested framework for
SCT programs has been formulated [14]. Supplies
f masks and antiviral medications should be surveyed
nd fortiﬁed, if possible. Dispersal of patients away
rom the center may need to be considered to mini-
ize spread. Consideration for closure of the program
ay be necessary if the extent of involvement of staff
nd general community threatens the center’s access
o vital resources to provide essential care.
Guidelines for identiﬁcation of patients with
5N1 infection have formulated (for a regularly up-
ated listing of H5N1-affected countries, see the
orld Organization for Animal Health Web site and
he World Health Organization Web site). Testing
or avian inﬂuenza A (H5N1) is indicated for hospi-
alized patients with (a) radiographically conﬁrmed
neumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, or
ther severe respiratory illness for which an alterna-
ive diagnosis has not been established plus (b) a his-
ory of travel within 10 days of symptom onset to a
ountry with documented H5N1 avian inﬂuenza in
oultry and/or humans. Testing for avian inﬂuenza A
H5N1) should be considered on a case-by-case basis
n consultation with state and local health departments
or hospitalized or ambulatory patients with (a) a
ocumented temperature 38°C (100.4°F) plus
b) cough, sore throat, and/or shortness of breath
lus (c) history of contact with poultry (eg, visited a
oultry farm, a household raising poultry, or a bird
arket) or a known or suspected human case of
nﬂuenza A (H5N1) in an H5N1-affected country
ithin 10 days of symptom onset (http://www.
dc.gov/ﬂu/avian/professional/han081304.htm).
Antiviral therapy with a neuraminidase inhibitor is
rucial to minimize morbidity and threat to life. Early
tart of antiviral therapy optimizes the therapeutic
eneﬁt. Because each 12-h delay after onset of initial
ymptoms compromises beneﬁt, initiation of therapy
hould be presumptive based on symptom assessment.
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Facing the Next Pandemic: Ready or Not 109nvolvement of extrapulmonary organs can occur with
evere infection, including liver, kidneys, and central
ervous system. There is anecdotal experience sug-
esting that treatment with high doses of corticoste-
oids may be of beneﬁt but this has not been formally
tudied. Bacterial superinfections are frequent and an-
ibiotics may be necessary. Vigilance for fungal super-
nfections should also be maintained.
ONCLUSIONS
Every 30-40 yr an inﬂuenza pandemic occurs.
ith global travel and commerce, the risk that a local
utbreak can rapidly become widespread is high. Mit-
gation of the threat of a pandemic will require coor-
inated efforts of multiple countries and health and
overnmental authorities. Locally, prevention and
reatment measures must be planned for to minimize
hreat to transplant recipients.
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